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by David McPherson
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Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy
Saint Louis University
David McPherson. Virtue and Meaning: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2020. 222 pages. $99.99 (hardcover).
“I want to be there when everyone suddenly finds out what it was all for.”
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brother Karamazov
What is the meaning of it all? This question strikes
us in quiet moments—perhaps when we are
standing near the crashing of waves, among pinescented winds, or before a setting sun. For most
of us, the thought vanishes all too quickly, and we
return to our busy work-a-world lives. Yet, when
tragedy strikes—when faced with searing pain or
chilling loss—we may also wonder in a different
way: “What is the meaning of it all?” As David
McPherson asks it: “Is life worth living in the face
of evil and suffering?” In both questions, we face
a “cosmodicy”, that is, the need to answer the
ultimate questions of purpose and meaning.
Perhaps what is essential to answering these
questions is an ancient concept: virtue.
Unearthed like an archeological find, virtue ethics
is comparatively new in contemporary moral
philosophy, and provides an attractive alternative.
For much of the 20th century, deontology (which
focuses on duty) and consequentialism (which
focuses on the end results of actions) dominated
academic ethics in the English-speaking world.
Contemporary virtue ethics retrieves the grammar
and concerns of the ancient Greek philosophers
to focus on the state of one’s character or one’s
habitual nature—in short, one’s state of being. For
virtue ethicists, it is the fulfillment of one’s nature,
as citizen of a particular community and as a
member of the human species, that is the highest
end: the achievement of “happiness,” or what
Aristotle called flourishing or eudaimonia.
Contemporary virtue ethics has emerged as a
powerful and promising alternative in secular
academic ethics. McPherson’s new book, Virtue
and Meaning, advances this debate by bringing into

focus a shortcoming in contemporary virtue
ethics: because human beings are “meaning
seeking animals” (1), virtue ethics needs more
than the flattened, secular outlook of modernity
that reduces human flourishing to a mere “natural
function.”1
In other words, the flourishing human life, as
envisioned by most of today’s neo-Aristotelian
virtue ethicists, is more “neo” than “Aristotelian.”
The good life of practicing the virtues, as
proposed by the new virtue ethicists, is little
different than from what’s implicit in modern
deontology and utilitarianism. McPherson, a
philosopher from Creighton University, draws
from Charles Taylor, who has described our
secular age as involving a disenchanted view of
reality where faith and questions of deep meaning
are mostly disregarded, or treated in merely
personal, subjective terms, as “one human
possibility among others.”2 McPherson argues that
a disenchanted view of human nature does not
square with our search for deep meaning. What is
needed, according to McPherson, is a “reenchanted” view of the world, of meaning, and of
human flourishing.
A re-enchanted view of reality allows us to
uncover a realm of “strong evaluative meaning”
and reclaim fundamental human values, like the
noble, dignified, and reverence worthy (32, 39).
After situating his project in the contemporary
debate, his task is to open up a space for a
consideration of wonder, awe, and a sense of the
grandeur of existence by extending the vocabulary
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of the virtues to include “piety, humility,
existential gratitude, and loving devotion” (42).
McPherson argues that without the virtues we are
blind and unresponsive to the deeper meaning in
life. Having courage, self-control, and wisdom
allows us to achieve human flourishing, true
happiness—“a higher nobler, more meaningful
mode of life” (53). We can see our lives as
“wholes” connected to a “narrative quest” rather
than as dismembered, functional, productive parts
(53). This does not mean that the pursuit of strong
evaluative meaning aided by the virtues will ensure
ease and pleasure. Things may fall apart.
Nonetheless, in the face of great evil McPherson
thinks that—aided by the virtues—we should still
seek “righteousness, come what may” (68). This was
true of the Letter-Writers who faced Nazi
persecution with dignity, courage, and even joy. In
seeking these deeper purposes, we will find a
richer good than fleeting happiness. Moreover,
McPherson thinks that in the long run there is a
“buoyance of the good”—a phrase borrowed
from John Cottingham (74), McPherson’s strong
evaluative meaning transforms the contemporary
conception of happiness and meaning. Further, it
reveals a shortcoming in modern virtue ethicists’
understanding of human flourishing. Yet, Virtue
and Meaning goes one step further.
We are “homo religiosus,” McPherson argues: We are
made for spiritualty. Beyond our work, our
entertainment, even our moral striving is a deeper
longing that can only be fulfilled in contemplation.
As Josef Pieper puts it,
All practical activity, from practice of the
ethical virtues to gaining the means of
livelihood, serves something other than itself.
And this other thing is not practical activity. It
is having what is sought after, while we rest
content in the results of our active efforts.
Precisely that is the meaning of the old adage
that the vita activa is fulfilled in the vita
contemplative.3
This contemplative activity is spiritual. In part, it is
the pursuit of wonder with a philosophical attitude
that becomes a “way of life” (169). Even more,
contemplation allows us to see the world with new

eyes: to partake in a “loving or affirmative
beholding” (177). As McPherson says, “all of our
work and striving is fulfilled in attentive
appreciation of our work as well as the world
around us” (177). In this, we can come to “feel at
home” in the world—at least, in part. McPherson
thinks that a wide variety of cosmic outlooks point
to our quest for meaning. Nonetheless,
McPherson affirms that we are made for a
personal relationship with a loving God beyond
this life. We are to give thanks “to” someone for
the goodness of existence. In sum, McPherson
presses home the need for re-enchantment. In
doing so, McPherson’s Virtue and Meaning is an
important book that points toward a new era of
virtue ethics.
After reading McPherson’s book, two weighty
questions arise for me. First, does McPherson’s
criticism do justice to Alasdair MacIntyre—a
philosopher central to the revival of virtue ethics?
McPherson places MacIntyre among the quasiscientific virtue ethicists. He charges MacIntyre
with holding that human flourishing is
“instrumental”, making our love for others merely
part of “good functioning” (83). Against this,
McPherson argues that only a re-enchanted
conception of strong evaluative meaning allows us
to see the true “dignity” and “sanctity” of others,
especially the marginalized and those facing great
disability. However, I find myself wondering
whether McPherson presents an overly
disenchanted MacIntyre. For example, MacIntyre
writes, “the deepest desire of every [human] being,
whether they acknowledge it or not, is to be at one
with God” (quoted in McPherson, 187).
As such, MacIntyre’s view seems open to the sort
of re-enchantment proposed by McPherson. If so,
then MacIntyre should be included with virtue
ethicists (like McPherson) blazing this new trail.
Second, what is the cure? That is, in light of
McPherson’s arguments, how shall we live?
McPherson’s book provides a diagnosis, but in
terms of providing the antidote to excessive
disenchantment, that path forward seems mostly
suggestive. Perhaps part of the antidote is right in
front of us—in our local communities. As Robert
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Putnam noted: Americans increasingly are
“bowling alone.”4 In our hyper-individualism, we
have lost the unity that binds us together. The loss
of participation in local social communities,
intensified in times of quarantines, lockdowns,
and hyper-isolation is pervasive in contemporary
life. Staring at screens, we long for deep,
meaningful relationships. Glass barriers—however
necessary—are no substitute for face-to-face. That
is to say, sharing in the life of a local community
may join us with one of life’s deepest human
values: the common good.
In addition, for those of us involved in Jesuit
higher education, we might note that the recently

Notes

released Universal Apostolic Preferences list first
“showing the way to God.” As an antidote to
disenchantment, this includes particular practices
of discernment that allow us to get in touch with
one’s deepest self, the space where God speaks to
us. McPherson’s argument lays bare a central
shortcoming in modern virtue ethics with sharp,
tight arguments, and he suggests a way forward
with quotes that sparkle like gems. However,
Virtue and Meaning is an academic work that
confronts theory with theory. Nonetheless, it
deserves praise for breaking hard theoretical
ground. In its path, we are invited to pursue a
deepened understanding of human flourishing
that unites virtue and meaning.
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